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Kaitaki ferry report finds sweeping faults, chaos, high chance of mass casualties

Thursday, 7 May 2026

TAIC chief commissioner David Clarke presents the final report of  Cook Strait ferry the Kaitaki, which lost power on the Cook Strait, New Zealand, 28 January, 2023.
TAIC chief commissioner David Clarke presents the final report of Cook Strait ferry the Kaitaki, which lost power on the Cook Strait, New Zealand, 28 January, 2023.

Sweeping condemnations of the emergency response after Kaitaki lost all power in Cook Strait have been detailed in a new report, showing Maritime NZ failed to properly respond to the scale of the evolving disaster.

The Transport Accident Investigation Commission’s (TAIC) final report into the January 28, 2023 incident was published on Thursday casting fresh light into the chaos on board, organisational failings on board and on land, and how close the 864 people on board were to a high probability of a “significant loss of life”.

It also reveals that, after ship engineers managed to restart the engines, there was second fault, which was quickly fixed, disabling propulsion on one side of the vessel as it passed the Wellington heads, near where Lyttelton to Wellington ferry the Wahine foundered in 1968 with the loss of 53 lives.

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TAIC chief commissioner David Clarke confirmed the second incident was in no way caused by the earlier one.

Passengers were made to put on life jackets as Cook Strait ferry Kaitaki lost power and drifted.
Passengers were made to put on life jackets as Cook Strait ferry Kaitaki lost power and drifted.

Maritime NZ operates a Maritime Incident Response Team (MIRT) to deal with emergencies at sea, with a “decision tree” starting with a duty controller being notified, who then makes a recommendation to the director, who can then set up the team.

The MIRT system was set up a decade earlier following the grounding of the Rena near Tauranga.

The duty controller decided against setting up the team and, 25 minutes after the Rescue Coordination Centre notified the controller, a senior duty manager texted the director about the situation.

The director did not see the text message for a further 10 minutes and started looking for more information, by which time the ship’s engines had started. The call was made to not set up the MIRT.

The TAIC report said the team should have been set up when the ship was without power, drifting towards a rocky shore as there was a “severe” risk of grounding, with potential for 'catastrophic damage”, a “high probability of significant loss of life”, “extremely challenging” rescue conditions, and a “substantial” risk of large-scale oil pollution.

Failure to activate the team would have affected the response if the situation escalated, the report said.

“The risk of a catastrophic outcome remained significant until such time as the vessel was safely berthed.”

An earlier TAIC preliminary report found the loss of power resulted from a rubber expansion joint, overdue for replacement, that blew after sitting on a shelf years after it should have been discarded instead of being installed in 2018.

The failed rubbed expansion joint on the Kaitaki was years out of date and overdue for replacement.
The failed rubbed expansion joint on the Kaitaki was years out of date and overdue for replacement.

The new report shows an engineer on board described the scene as ”organised chaos, everybody was everywhere trying to do everything“.

When the first “blackout” occurred some engineers tried to reset tripped circuit breakers unaware others were trying to start pumps, which required the circuit breakers to be on.

The ship’s previous owner had developed procedures for the loss of high temperature cooling system “as this was a known potential failure that had occurred twice before” but it appeared engineers on the ship were not familiar with these. Returning the power sooner would have been likely if they had.

“Time was a crucial factor, and if the ship had not been arrested by its anchors, a very serious marine casualty was virtually certain,” the report said.

The high jeopardy of the situation was detailed in the report, showing low tide was at 5.47pm, meaning an incoming tide was about to start, which would have likely “affected the way the anchors were holding the ship”. Power was restored at 5.57pm, after lifeboats were already prepared for launch.

The tugs alongside the Kaitaki in January 2023.
The tugs alongside the Kaitaki in January 2023.

Clarke confirmed all steps off the onboard steps the master could have taken before the next step – the call to abandon ship.

The ship’s team estimated it was 12 minutes off hitting land when the anchors held. Clarke confirmed an incoming tide could have altered the anchor with a strong onshore wind already blowing.

Previously reported issues with the two harbour tugs’ ability to connect to the ship were again highlighted but the TAIC report showed that, if they had connected, a 'secondary incident” was highly likely.

Crews on neither the tugs nor Kaitaki had emergency tow training, the tugs were not designed for ocean salvage and mooring points on the Kaitaki had lower breaking points and could have failed.

A Maritime NZ statement said a mass rescue plan was initiated as soon as the mayday was called and director Kirstie Hewlett said the Rescue Coordination Centre quickly co-ordinated response planes, boats and land support. They also set up an emergency co-ordination centre.

“Once the ferry regained power, it maintained oversight until it safely came alongside at Wellington,” she said.

She accepted the MIRT should have been stood up but disputed the commission’s claims that it would have hampered the ability to escalate promptly if the situation escalated. While not formally declared, the team’s functions effectively were, she said. MIRTs were set up for subsequent maritime incidents such as the Aratere grounding and MV Shiling power outage.

Maritime NZ prosecuted KiwiRail over the event, which KiwiRail pleaded guilty to. KiwiRail was fined $432,500 for failing to maintain equipment aboard Kaitaki, after it lost power on January 28, 2023 and drifted toward shore.

The TAIC report comes in the same week as Maritime NZ prosecuted KiwiRail over the Aratere grounding. KiwiRail has been ordered to pay $400,000 for putting crew and passengers at risk in Aratere ferry grounding.

Clarke, from TAIC, on Thursday said not all parts of the MIRT were followed, even informally.

“Establishment of the MIRT is a necessary and useful step in relation to a major and significant maritime incident,” he said.

KiwiRail accepted the TAIC findings for the Kaitaki incident and said it had already made changes.

“The incident was serious, and it prompted a comprehensive reassessment of how we manage and maintain our ferries, and how our crews are supported to respond quickly and safely in emergency situations through training, and regular exercises,” chief operations officer Duncan Roy said.